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Human reliability analysis (HRA) has long been employed in nuclear power applications to 
account for the human contribution to safety. HRA is used qualitatively to identify and model 
sources of human error and quantitatively to calculate the human error probabilities of particular 
tasks. The nuclear power emphasis of HRA has helped ensure safe practices and risk-informed 
decision making in the international nuclear industry. This emphasis has also tended to result in a 
methodological focus on control room operations that are very specific to nuclear power, thereby 
potentially limiting the applicability of the methods for other safety critical domains. In recent 
years, there has been interest to explore HRA in other domains, including aerospace, defense, 
transportation, mining, and oil and gas. Following several high profile events in the oil and gas 
industry, notably the Macondo well kick event in the U.S., there has been a move to use HRA to 
model and reduce risk in future oil drilling and production activities. Organizations like the Bureau 
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement are adapting the risk framework of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission for offshore purposes. In this paper, we present recent work to apply HRA 
methods to the analysis of offshore activities. We present the results of retrospective analyses using 
three popular HRA methods: SPAR-H, Petro-HRA, and CREAM. With the exception of Petro-
HRA, these HRA methods were developed primarily for nuclear power event analysis. We present 
a comparison of the findings of these methods and a discussion of lessons learned in applying the 
methods to offshore events. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the suitability of HRA 
methods for oil and gas risk analysis but also to identify topics where future research would be 
warranted to tailor these HRA methods. 
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1 Human Reliability Analysis Methods 
1.1 General Overview of Quantification Approaches 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have historically been developed to account for 
and mitigate human errors in nuclear power applications. Recently there is increased use of HRA 
outside the nuclear domain such as to support quantitative risk assessment for oil and gas settings. 
As HRA is generalized to new areas, it is important that existing HRA methods are validated to a 
broader range of uses. Where there are shortcomings in existing HRA methods, the methods should 
be adapted to support these new domains, or new HRA methods should be developed. This 
validation and evolution of methods ensures that HRA identifies and thereby minimizes risk. 
HRA methods serve the twofold purpose to classify the sources of errors qualitatively and to 
estimate the human error probability (HEP). Qualitative error classification serves as the basis for 
quantification. Of the roughly 60 HRA methods created, most are centered on quantification [1]. 
Boring [2] proposed the following ways of classifying HRA quantification methods: 
 Scenario Matching Methods: This approach, used by the original HRA method, the Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [3], entails matching the human failure event (HFE) 
to the best fitting example scenario in a lookup table and using the HEP associated with that 
template event as the basis for quantification. See Table 1(a). 
 Decision-Tree Methods: Methods like the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) [4] follow a 
decision tree (similar to an event tree), which guides the quantification along a number of 
predefined analysis decision points. See Table 1(b). 
 Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) Adjustment Methods: In these methods, exemplified by 
approaches like the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-HRA (SPAR-H) method [5], the PSFs 
serve as multipliers on nominal error rates. For example, a PSF with a negative influence would 
serve to increase the HEP over a nominal or default error rate. A list of PSFs and associated 
multipliers is provided by the method. See Table 1(c). 
 Expert Estimation Methods: In these approaches, subject matter experts including risk analysts 
will estimate the likelihood of the HFEs. A Technique for Human Error ANAlysis 
(ATHEANA) [6] uses a structured expert estimation approach to arrive at HEPs. Such 
approaches often provide anchor values for quantification to assist subject matter experts in 
producing the relevant HEP, but the specific method used to derive the HEP and the factors 
that may influence the quantification are largely left to the subject matter experts. Because 
expert estimation methods typically do not specify how to decompose the factors shaping the 
quantification but rather look at the HFE as a whole, they are often referred to as holistic 
approaches [7]. See Table 1(d). 
The wide availability of HRA methods may leave the analyst overwhelmed at which methods 
to select for which applications. Recent method comparisons exist for nuclear (e.g., [1,8]), and 
they provide helpful benchmarks in considering the advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) HRA method guidance [9] serves 
as another helpful template for downselecting HRA methods. Across multiple selection criteria, 
NASA selected four primary HRA methods to be used individually or in combination. Table 2 
lists the four methods selected by NASA and a summary of their primary strengths and weaknesses 
in a generalized form (e.g., without consideration of specific NASA domain applications). While 
this downselection is helpful, it does not necessarily represent optimal methods with respect to 
offshore oil applications. 
 
Table 1 - Examples of Common HRA Quantification Approaches 
 
(a) Scenario matching lookup table from THERP 
[3], which provides the HEP and the error factor 
(EF) for uncertainty. 
 
(b) Decision tree from CBDT [4] provides HEPs 
for the event-tree end states. 
 
 
(c) Example PSF multipliers on the nominal HEP 
(0.001) for diagnosis tasks in SPAR-H [5]. 
 





This is first done by having the experts try to imagine how many times they would expect crews (or an
individual operator if that is more appropriate for the action of interest) to commit the HFE/UA (such as in
a simulation of the scenario and its context) as a reflection of the level of difficulty or challenge that has
been previously expressed.  The following table often proves helpful in these initial evaluations, until the
experts begin to develop a sense of the meaning of the probability values.  While it is sometimes
recommended that experts be limited to a few specific choices, we have found that they quickly begin to
demand more flexibility in their assignments, which is encouraged.  Table 3.8-2 provides a suggestion for
this initial calibration.
Table 3.8-2.  Suggested Set of Initial Calibration Points for the Experts
Circumstance Probability Meaning
The operator(s) is “Certain” to fail 1.0 Failure is ensured.  All
crews/operators would not
perform the desired action
correctly and on time.
The operator(s) is “Likely” to fail ~ 0.5 5 out of 10 would fail.  The
level of difficulty is
sufficiently high that we
should see many failures if
all the crews/operators were
to experience this scenario.
The operator(s) would “Infrequently” fail ~ 0.1 1 out of 10 would fail.  The
level of difficulty is
moderately high, such that
we should see an occasional
failure if all of the
crews/operators were to
experience this scenario.
The operator(s) is “Unlikely” to fail ~ 0.01 1 out of 100 would fail.  The
level of difficulty is quite low
and we should not see any
failures if all the
crews/operators were to
experience this scenario.
The operator(s) is “Extremely Unlikely” to fail ~ 0.001 1 out of 1000 would fail. 
This desired action is so easy
that it is almost
inconceivable that any
crew/operator would fail to
perform the desired action
correctly and on time.
Table 2 - The Four HRA Methods Selected for NASA Use 
 
Method Approach Strengths Weaknesses 
THERP Lookup table Widely used original HRA 
method. THERP specifies a 
complete process model for 
HRA. It has good coverage of 
errors related to human 
actions. 
Little coverage of cognitive 
factors. Method may have 
limited generalizability beyond 
the nuclear-specific human 
interactions in the lookup 
tables. 




Good coverage of cognitive 
factors and detailed task 
decomposition approach for 
qualitative insights into errors. 
Method is complex in practice 
(e.g., involving many steps for 
basic quantification) and tends 
to produce similar HEPs 
regardless of performance 
drivers. 




Good use of human factors 
literature as data source to 
validate HEPs for task types. 
The task types are aligned to 
nuclear power plant 
operations, and specialized 
variants need to be developed 
for air traffic control and rail 




Simplified method that can be 
used without extensive HRA 
background. PSFs allow 
generalizability beyond 
predefined task types. 
Quantification-only approach 
that assumes HFEs defined in 
the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA). PSF 
multipliers are not calibrated to 
non-nuclear techniques. 
a. Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method [10] 
b. Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment [11] 
 
 
1.2 HRA Methods for Oil and Gas 
Two HRA methods have been developed specifically for oil and gas, and they are briefly noted 
below. 
1.2.1 Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) 
Despite information suggesting major accident sequences may be attributed to several risk 
influencing factors classified as technical, human, operational and organizational, the majority of 
quantitative risk analyses of offshore oil and gas production platforms has been directed at 
technical safety systems. The Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) of hydrocarbon 
releases (BORA-Release) is a method for carrying out the qualitative and quantitative risk analysis 
of platform specific hydrocarbon release frequency [12]. In finer detail, the method assesses the 
effect of risk reducing measures and risk increasing changes within operations. BORA affords the 
ability to analyze both the effect of safety barriers put in place to impede the release of 
hydrocarbons as well as how platform specific conditions such as the aforementioned technical, 
human, operational and organizational factors influence the performance of the barrier. Analysis 
of hydrocarbon release risk via the BORA method is executed with the use of barrier block 
diagram/event trees, fault trees, and risk influence diagrams. 
The BORA-Release method is made up of eight steps: 
1. Development of a basic risk model including release scenarios 
2. Modeling for the performance of safety barriers 
3. Assignment of industry average probabilities/frequencies and risk quantification based on 
these probabilities/frequencies 
4. Development of risk influence diagrams 
5. Scoring of risk influencing factors 
6. Weighting of risk influencing factors 
7. Adjustment of industry average probabilities/frequencies 
8. Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk related to hydrocarbon 
release. 
Many of these steps overlap basic HRA processes found across HRA methods like 
[3,4,5,6,10,11]. BORA focuses on the breakdown of barriers designed as part of defense in depth 
to prevent accidents in oil and gas production facilities. These barriers, however, may omit many 
of the HFEs that can precipitate accidents at the facility. HRAs centered on barriers may overlook 
important precursors to many types of accidents. Additionally, BORA’s emphasis on prevention 
of accidents may limit some of its application as a risk analytic tool for as-built systems and 
processes. 
1.2.2 Petro-HRA 
The Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian state oil company, Statoil (now called 
Equinor), recently sponsored development of an HRA method to aid human factors analysts in 
completing HRAs for oil and gas applications. The approach, named the Petro-HRA method [13], 
features seven steps that mirror much of what is outlined in the IEEE-1082 HRA guide [14]: 
1. Scenario definition 
2. Qualitative data collection 
3. Task analysis 
4. Human error identification 
5. Human error modeling 
6. Human error quantification 
7. Human error reduction. 
Quantification in the Petro-HRA method is based on SPAR-H [5], offering some refinement 
to PSFs and multipliers to make them more oil and gas industry specific. SPAR-H was selected as 
the basis method because other HRA methods that had been used in the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry were found to generate unreasonably high HEPs or have low interrater reliability [15]. 
Because SPAR-H is primarily a quantification approach, additional guidance was developed to aid 
analysts in completing the qualitative portion of HRA, including translating a task analysis to HFEs 
when they are not already defined by a PRA. Because HRAs are performed to support the safety 
evaluation of new technologies in the Norwegian oil industry, specific guidance is provided to 
improve the system design or operations process to minimize human errors when they are 
identified. 
2 Example Human Reliability Analysis for Well Kick 
2.1 Selection of HRA Methods 
In this section, we provide a review of the same well blowout event using three different HRA 
methods: SPAR-H [5], Petro-HRA [13], and CREAM [10]. The selection of these methods is based 
on the widespread use of SPAR-H and CREAM for non-nuclear applications, including many 
completed analyses for oil and gas. Petro-HRA, which is a derivative method of SPAR-H tailored 
to petroleum applications, serves as a useful benchmark. The same HFEs are analyzed using all 
three methods, and a brief explanation is provided on how the analyses are completed. The 
explanations of the analyses provide tutorial details, but analysts should ensure they refer back to 
the source guidance for the methods for a better understanding of how to apply the methods.  
2.2 Human Failure Events 
SPAR-H and CREAM assume the HFE has been defined in the PRA, while Petro-HRA 
provides guidance on how to define the HFE. For the present purposes, we have characterized 
three primary HFEs related to the well kick as depicted in Figure 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
HFE1 refers to the detection of the well kick, HFE2 refers to responding to the well kick by 
actuating the annular of the blowout preventer (BOP), and HFE3 refers to performing the 
emergency well disconnect. A brief description of the well-kick related accident is necessary for 
those who are not familiar with the human activities pertaining to the well-kick event or the 
Deepwater Horizon accident. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Example Human Failure Events in Sequence 
An excellent and detailed chronological account of the specific events can be found in Chapter 
2 of the Transocean Investigation Report titled Macondo Well Incident [16]. All event details are 
not necessary for demonstrating the HRA methods; therefore, here only a brief description is 
provided for context to the analysis. The event began on April 20, 2010, when an oil and gas 
blowout incident at the Macondo Oil Well caused an explosion and fire that resulted in 11 fatalities, 
17 seriously injured personnel, the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, and the release 
of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The event can be attributed, in part, to a 
failure to detect the well kick and subsequent blowout or uncontrolled release of oil and gas 
hydrocarbons from the well. The backpressure drove the hydrocarbons through the drilling 
apparatus to the rig, in which it was ignited in an explosion that subsequently set fire to the rig. 
The rig had finished the exploratory drilling phase of operations and was in the process of 
performing temporary well-abandonment activities to prepare the well for the production phase of 
operations which another rig was scheduled to perform.  
The well-abandonment activities entail plugging the well with cement, ensuring the integrity 
of the cement plugs via a negative pressure test, and then retracting the drilling apparatus. The 
negative pressure test circulates chemically treated mud that serves as the primary barrier to 
prevent the hydrocarbon from traveling through the well and into the drilling apparatus. The 
negative pressure created by circulating the mud simulates the low pressure sea floor atmosphere 
in order to verify the cement plug is properly sealing the well. Pressure and flow indications were 
available to the drilling team, though due to urgency to finish the drilling phase of operations, they 
went unnoticed until the negative pressure test was performed. A supervising representative from 
British Petroleum overseeing the drilling operation did raise a concern to the driller; however, any 
concern was improperly alleviated by more experienced drilling team members stating the odd 
pressure values were not uncommon and did not merit any significant concerns. Operations 
resumed, even though the undetected kick had occurred up to an hour prior and was continuing to 
worsen over time.  
The drilling crew closed the upper annular of the blow out preventer (BOP) at 9:34 PM in 
attempt to arrest the kick. The high pressure and volume of hydrocarbon flow caused the piping 
within the BOP annular to shift such that a joint between two pipes impeded the closing mechanism 
and the annular failed to seal the well. Mud began to flow onto the drilling floor, and in response 
the flow was diverted to the mud-gas separators at 9:45 PM. The volume of flow quickly exceeded 
the mud-gas separators’ capacity, and the blowout alarm sounded at 9:47 PM. Shortly thereafter, 
at 9:49 PM, the rig lost main power followed quickly by two explosions. At 9:56 PM, an 
emergency well disconnect was attempted in which the BOP was designed to sever the pipe to 
eliminate flow to the rig. The bridge team received indication that the disconnect mechanism was 
activated; however, the pipe was not successfully severed, and flow continued. The order to 
abandon ship was issued at 10:00 PM. 
2.3 A Brief Note on Retrospective HRA 
The following HRA walkthroughs are examples of retrospective HRA. Retrospective HRA is 
an analysis that looks at an event that has already happened. Of course, the probability that the 
event happened is 1.0, because it actually did occur. The purpose of a retrospective analysis is to 
determine the likelihood that the event should have happened given its context. In colloquial terms, 
was the event simply bad luck, or was it the systematic product of circumstances that could have 
been prevented? In identifying the causes of the event, a retrospective analysis looks at the 
probability that such an event could occur again, given the same circumstances. Retrospective 
analyses are crucial for establishing corrective actions and preventing recurrence of similar events. 
It should be noted that a retrospective analysis will have greater and more specific insights than 
would a typical prospective analysis. A prospective analysis, such as an HRA conducted when a 
system is being designed or built, must rely on the normal course of operations. In other words, 
the context must be kept general to cover a variety of operating contexts. It is not typical to assume 
the confluence of multiple poor factors during a prospective analysis. In contrast, a retrospective 
analysis would feature all known mitigating factors that caused the event to transpire. As such, a 
retrospective analysis will inherently be more conservative than a prospective analysis. It is 
assumed that for an extreme event like the Deepwater Horizon accident, the retrospective HEP 
generated by most HRA methods would be close to 1.0. This represents a much more severe form 
of the well blowout than would be modelled in a prospective analysis. 
2.4 Example Analysis Using SPAR-H 
2.4.1 Overview 
Here, we demonstrate SPAR-H [5] as a simplified method to help understand how to quantify 
the three HFEs. A SPAR-H quantification requires several steps: 
1. Define the HFE (completed by PRA and a prerequisite for the SPAR-H analysis) 
2. Determine the appropriate SPAR-H worksheet 
3. Determine the appropriate SPAR-H nominal HEP 
4. Evaluate the PSFs 
5. Calculate the product of the nominal HEP and the PSF multipliers 
6. Apply correction factor for dependence. 
These steps are walked through in separate subsections below. The first step—defining the 
HFEs—was detailed in the previous section. 
2.4.2 Determine the Appropriate SPAR-H Worksheet 
SPAR-H contains two types of analysis worksheets: 
 At power (NUREG/CR-6883, Appendix A [5]) 
 Low power and shutdown (NUREG/CR-6883, Appendix B [5]). 
The origin of SPAR-H as an HRA method for nuclear power applications is clear here. The basic 
difference between these two worksheets involves whether the plant is producing electricity (i.e., 
at power) or in maintenance or refueling mode (i.e., low power and shutdown). It is assumed that 
there is more opportunity for high consequence events and tighter time windows to take recovery 
actions during at-power operations. An offshore analogy for at power would be during drilling 
activities. 
For the well kick scenarios, we assume the SPAR-H at-power worksheets are applicable. 
2.4.3 Determine the Appropriate SPAR-H Nominal HEP 
The SPAR-H worksheets for at-power and low-power-and-shutdown each have two task types 
that are modeled. The task types determine the nominal or default HEP for the HFE: 
 Diagnosis: This HFE primarily involves cognitive activities such as monitoring or decision-
making. The nominal HEP for diagnosis HFEs is 1E-2 (0.01). 
 Action: This HFE primarily involves carrying out physical activities such as manipulating 
equipment. The nominal HEP for action HFEs is 1E-3 (0.001). 
Because an HFE may involve a series of activities by the human involved, it is not uncommon 
for the HFE to be classified as both diagnosis and action. In that case, the joint HFE can logically 
be thought to occur due to diagnosis or action errors. Mathematically, this means that the nominal 
HEPs for diagnosis and action are added together. 
In our well kick example, all HFEs involve diagnosis and action components, since they 
require cognitive monitoring, decision-making, and interaction with equipment. 
2.4.4 Evaluate the PSFs 
SPAR-H uses nominal HEPs to represent the generic diagnosis and action tasks performed 
within the HFE. These nominal HEPs are then modified using multipliers corresponding to 
different levels of influence of the PSFs. SPAR-H makes use of eight PSFs, encompassing: 
 Available time to complete the task (which is independent of any time pressure the personnel 
may experience) 
 Internal stress and external stressors 
 The complexity of the task and scenario 
 The experience and training of the personnel completing the tasks under analysis 
 The procedures—either written or oral—to guide the personnel in completing the task 
 The ergonomics of the system being used and the human-machine interfaces available to the 
personnel 
 The fitness for duty—including degraded fitness due to fatigue of long-duration events—of 
the personnel completing the task 
 Work processes, including organizational factors, command and control, and communications. 
Generally, the SPAR-H PSFs can have three types of effects: 
1. Negative: A negative effect means that the PSF decreases human reliability and thereby 
increases the HEP. For example, to denote the negative effect of available time would mean to 
suggest that there was inadequate time available to complete the task. 
2. Nominal: A nominal effect means that the default applies. Nominal time, for example, suggests 
that there’s adequate time to complete the task without undue time pressure or extra time. 
3. Positive: A positive effect means that the PSF increases human reliability and thereby 
decreases the HEP. A positive effects results in giving credit to the human actions. For 
example, positive available time means that there is extra time over what is needed to 
accomplish the task. 
In the absence of information to inform the assignment, the analyst would denote “inadequate 
information,” which simply assigns a nominal value. 
To assign SPAR-H PSFs, it is useful for the human reliability analyst to consult with an 
operations specialist to answer the following questions: 
 Which personnel are involved in this task? 
 What indicators are available for the task? 
 What are the timing constraints that could interfere with a successful outcome? 
 Do personnel have adequate training and experience on the task? 
 What’s needed to perform this task successfully? 
 What can go wrong? 
 What could influence personnel performance in terms of actions or decision-making? 
For the three example HFEs, the following PSF effects could be noted: 
 For detection of the well kick (HFE1), the time available will vary from situation to situation, 
but once a kick occurs, there is a limited window of time before the formation fluid reaches 
the blowout preventer. As the available time erodes, the ability of the drilling crew to respond 
decreases proportionately to the decreasing time window. It may be assumed that limited 
available time to detect will adversely affect the HEP. The clock is ticking, so to speak, which 
can only operate negatively on the outcome of the event. All other PSFs are assumed to be 
nominal. 
 The detection of a well kick triggers a change: response actions are needed in order to prevent 
a blowout (HFE2) and ultimately disconnect the well from the oil rig (HFE3). This operational 
shift will generally result in multiple elevated negative PSFs relative to nominal or normal 
operations. The time window is closing, but there may also be elevated negative stress and 
complexity, potentially diminished levels of experience for this type of situation, and 
potentially poor to incomplete procedures. Underlying the situation, negative work processes 
such as breakdowns in communication, coordination, or command and control may also 
manifest. 
While detection of the well kick (HFE1) can be seen as a mostly nominal influence of the PSFs, 
the transition to emergency operations to prevent blowout (HFE2) and disconnect the well (HFE3) 
will likely invoke multiple negative PSFs. 
2.4.5 Calculate the Product of the Nominal HEP and the PSF Multipliers 
When negative, nominal, or positive effects of PSFs have been determined, these are matched 
to the appropriate level in the SPAR-H PSF multiplier tables. If there is a negative or positive 
effect of a PSF, this phase involves determining the degree of that effect, which corresponds to a 
multiplier. A summary of SPAR-H multiplier assignments for the well kick detection, response, 
and disconnect HFEs is found in Table 3. For the detection HFE, a single negative PSF—available 
time—is assumed. For the response HFE, three slightly negative PSFs—available time, stress, and 
complexity—are assumed. For the disconnect HFE, two negative PSFs—available time and 
stress—are assumed. 
The basic HEP is defined in SPAR-H as the nominal HEP multiplied by the product of all PSF 
multipliers: 
Basic HEP = Nominal HEP × ∏ PSF Multipliers (Eq. 1) 
For HFE1 related to well kick detection, the PSF is calculated separately for diagnosis and 
action: 
HFE1 Diagnosis Basic HEP = 1E-2 × 10 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 1E-1 = 0.1 (Eq. 2) 
HFE1 Action Basic HEP = 1E-3 × 10 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 1E-2 = 0.01 (Eq. 3) 
Table 3 - SPAR-H Assignments for Well Kick Detection, Response, and Disconnect 
 
PSFs PSF Levels 
HFE1: Well Kick 
Detection 
HFE2: Well Kick 
Response 













Available time Inadequate time HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 
Barely adequate 
time 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
Nominal time 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Extra time 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Expansive time 0.01 0.01 0.1 to 0.01 0.01 0.1 to 0.01 0.01 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Stress/stressors Extreme 5 5 5 5 5 5 
High 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Complexity Highly complex 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Moderately complex 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Obvious diagnosis 0.1 N/A 0.1 N/A 0.1 N/A 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Experience/ 
training 
Low 10 3 10 3 10 3 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
High 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Procedures Not available 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Incomplete 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Available, but poor 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Diagnostic/symptom 
oriented 
0.5 N/A 0.5 N/A 0.5 N/A 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ergonomics/ 
HMI 
Missing/ misleading 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Poor 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fitness for 
duty 
Unfit HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 HEP = 1.0 
Degraded fitness 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Work 
processes 
Poor 2 5 2 5 2 5 
Nominal 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Good 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 
Insufficient info 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
The joint basic HEP is simply the sum of the diagnosis and action basic HEPs: 
HFE1 Joint Basic HEP = Diagnosis Basic HEP + Action Basic HEP 
= 1E-1 + 1E-2 = 1.1E-1 = 0.11 (Eq. 4) 
The same general form of the equation applies to HFE2 related to the response to well kick and 
HFE3 related to the well disconnect, but with one exception. Because it is possible to have a 
resultant HEP greater than 1.0 when there are more than three negative HEPs, SPAR-H prescribes 
a correction factor: 
Corrected Basic HEP = 
Nominal HEP × Π PSF Multipliers
Nominal HEP × (Π PSF Multipliers - 1) + 1
 (Eq. 5) 
Thus, for HFE2 we first calculate the product of the PSF multipliers, which in this case is identical 
for the diagnosis and action tasks: 
∏ PSF Multipliers = 10 × 2 × 2 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 40 (Eq. 6) 
This product is then applied in the corrected basic HEP equation for diagnosis and action: 
HFE2 Corrected Diagnosis Basic HEP = 
1E-2 × 40
1E-2 × (40 - 1) + 1
 = 0.288 (Eq. 7) 
HFE2 Corrected Action Basic HEP = 
1E-3 × 40
1E-3 × (40 - 1) + 1
 = 0.0385 (Eq. 8) 
The joint basic HEP for HFE2 is calculated by adding the two basic HEPs: 
HFE2 Joint Basic HEP = 0.288 + 0.0385 = 0.326 (Eq. 9) 
HFE3 is calculated identically to HFE2 but with different multipliers since stress is much 
higher while the complexity of activating the well disconnect is lower. We first calculate the 
product of the PSF multipliers, which in this case is identical for the diagnosis and action tasks: 
∏ PSF Multipliers = 10 × 5 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 50 (Eq. 10) 
HFE3 only has two negative PSFs. Thus, the basic (uncorrected) HEP is calculated: 
HFE3 Diagnosis Basic HEP = 1E-2 × 50 = 5E-1 = 0.5 (Eq. 11) 
HFE3 Action Basic HEP = 1E-3 × 50 = 5E-2 = 0.05 (Eq. 12) 
The joint basic HEP for HFE3 is calculated by adding the two basic HEPs: 
HFE3 Joint Basic HEP = 0.5 + 0.05 = 0.55 (Eq. 13) 
There is nearly a threefold increase in the basic HEP between HFE1 and HFE2 due to the 
increased effects of negative PSFs for stress and complexity between well kick detection and 
response. A further increase in the basic HEP occurs between the HFE2 and HFE3 for the well 
disconnect. 
2.4.6 Apply Correction Factor for Dependence 
In the final stage of SPAR-H quantification, a correction factor is applied for dependence. 
Dependence in SPAR-H means that the second or subsequent HFE in sequence may result in 
greater likelihood of human error. If appropriate, a correction factor is applied to the basic HEP. 
For sequences of two or more HFEs, SPAR-H considers four factors that influence 
dependence: 
 Same (s) or different (d) crew between the HFEs 
 Close (c) or not close (nc) in time between the HFEs 
 Same (s) or different (d) location between the HFEs 
 Additional (a) or no additional (na) cues (i.e., information available to crew) between the 
HFEs. 
The more the HFEs share crew, time, location, and cues, the more likely there is to be 
dependence between them. SPAR-H uses a dependency condition table (see Table I-4) to classify 
dependence along a scale from Zero, Low, Moderate, High, to Complete. 
 




HFE1 is the first HFE in the sequence and by definition does not have dependence. We assume 
HFE2 to have somewhat different crew responding to the well kick. HFE2 and HFE3 follow closely 
in time, have the same location, but also have additional cues. The resultant dependence level as 
traced (d-c-s-a) in Table 4 is moderate dependence. 
The conditional HEP is the basic HEP corrected for dependence. SPAR-H features the 
following equations for levels of the conditional HEP: 
 Zero Dependence: Conditional HEP = Basic HEP 
 Low Dependence: Conditional HEP = (1 + 19 × Basic HEP) / 20 
 Moderate Dependence: Conditional HEP = (1 + 6 × Basic HEP) / 7 
 High Dependence: Conditional HEP = (1 + Basic HEP) / 2 
 Complete Dependence: Conditional HEP = 1.0. 
For HFE2 and HFE3 assuming moderate dependence, we have: 
HFE2 Conditional HEP = (1 + 6 × 0.326) / 7 = 0.422 (Eq. 14) 
HFE3 Conditional HEP = (1 + 6 × 0.55) / 7 = 0.614 (Eq. 15) 
Moderate dependence resulted in the HEP for HFE2 and HFE3 each increasing by nearly 0.1 in our 
example. 
Using the SPAR-H method, we quantified the HEPs for the three HFEs, arriving at: 
Detect well kick: HEPHFE1 = 0.11 (Eq. 16) 
Respond to well kick: HEPHFE2 = 0.422 (Eq. 17) 
Well Disconnect: HEPHFE3 = 0.614.  (Eq. 18) 
A final note on SPAR-H is that it only provides the HEP, not a measure of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is calculated using the constrained noninformative prior, a method for calculating 
parameters assuming a single input parameter on a beta distribution. Some PRA software feature 
the ability to calculate the uncertainty in SPAR-H if required by the analyst. 
2.5 Example Analysis Using Petro-HRA 
2.5.1 Overview 
As noted, the Petro-HRA method [13] is a modified variant of SPAR-H developed specifically 
for applications in the oil and gas industry. As outlined in the brief introduction in Section 1.2.2, 
the activities involved with performing the analysis for the Petro-HRA method align closely with 
SPAR-H. The terminology is slightly different, and some additional guidance specific to the oil 
and gas industry is included. For example, the SPAR-H method relies on the PRA model to screen 
and identify HFEs, while the Petro-HRA method does not assume the HFE is defined by the PRA. 
2.5.2 Performance Shaping Factor Definitions 
Petro-HRA uses the same quantification framework as SPAR-H, but it uses modified PSFs that 
are tailored to address the context of oil and gas including offshore drilling and refinery operations. 
The modified PSFs for Petro-HRA include: 
1. Time 
2. Threat stress (equivalent to stress in SPAR-H) 
3. Task complexity 
4. Experience/Training 
5. Procedures 
6. Human-machine interface 
7. Attitudes to safety, work and management support 
8. Teamwork 
9. Physical working environment. 
The first six PSFs (i.e., time, threat stress, task complexity, experience/training, procedures, 
and human-machine interface) are nearly identical to the PSFs in SPAR-H. Petro-HRA has three 
different PSFs that replace the fitness for duty and work process PSFs from SPAR-H. The PSF 
entitled “Attitudes to safety, work and management support” reflects organizational aspects of the 
context surrounding the HFE. The teamwork PSF pertains to the level of coordination and the 
efficacy of the team to accomplish common and valued goals. The PSF for physical working 
environment is a more explicit evaluation of the ergonomics surrounding the work environment. 
In contrast to SPAR-H, physical ergonomics can play a more significant role in the oil and gas 
industry given the sometimes harsh working environments, and therefore it is defined by its own 
PSF. 
2.5.3 Performance Shaping Factor Levels and Multipliers 
A significant difference between SPAR-H and Petro-HRA is the how the levels of the PSF 
multipliers are treated. In SPAR-H, the levels for the multipliers of each PSF are uniquely defined. 
Petro-HRA simplifies the multiplier levels, such that each PSF has the same ranking system for 
impact on performance. The same categorical levels exist across all PSFs, ranging from two levels 
of negative effect, a nominal effect, and one level of positive effect. However, the assignment of 
a multiplier value itself has specific criteria and specific numerical values for each PSF. Table 5 
provides examples of the multipliers for attitudes to safety, work and management support. Table 
6 shows the same multipliers for the time PSF. 
 
Table 5 - Petro-HRA PSF for Attitudes to Safety, Work and Management Support (from [13]) 
 
Multipliers  Levels  Level descriptions  
50  Very high negative effect on 
performance.  
In this situation safety is not at all prioritized over other 
concerns when it is appropriate or there are extremely 
negative attitudes to work conduct (for example the operators 
are not monitoring or awake when they should be). There is 
very low mindfulness about safety. The operators do not 
experience management support, for example in strong 
management pressure for production even if safety is clearly in 
question.  
10  Moderate negative effect on 
performance.  
In this situation it is not specified by management that safety 
should be prioritized when that is appropriate. The operators 
are uncertain if safety should be prioritized or not, or the 
operators are uncertain about rules and regulations that are 
important for performing the task.  
1  Nominal effect on performance.  The operators have adequate attitudes to safety and work 
conduct and there is management support to prioritize safety 
when that is appropriate. The operator(s) shows mindfulness 
about safety. Attitudes to safety, work and management 
support have neither a negative nor a large positive effect on 
performance.  
0.5  Moderate positive effect on performance  The operator(s) has very good attitudes to safety and work 
conduct and there is explicit management support to prioritize 
safety when that is appropriate. The operator(s) shows a very 
high degree of mindfulness about safety.  
1  Not applicable.  This PSF is not relevant for this task or scenario.  
Table 6 - Petro-HRA PSF for Time (from [13]) 
 
Multipliers  Levels  Level descriptions  
HEP=1 Extremely high negative effect on 
performance. 
Operator(s) does not have enough time to successfully complete 
the task. 
50  Very high negative effect on 
performance. 
The available time is the minimum time required to perform the 
task or close to the minimum time to perform the task. In this 
situation the operator(s) has very high time pressure or they 
have to speed up very much to do the task in time. 
10  Moderate negative effect on 
performance 
The operator(s) has limited time to perform the task. However, 
there is more time available than the minimum time required. 
In this situation the operator(s) has high time pressure, or they 
have to speed up much to do the task in time. 
1  Nominal effect on performance.  There is enough time to do the task. The operator(s) only has a 
low degree of time pressure, or they do not need to speed up 
much to do the task. When comparing the available time to the 
required time the analyst concludes that time would neither 
have a negative nor a positive effect on performance. 
0.5  Moderate positive effect on performance  There is extra time to perform the task. 
In this situation the operator(s) has considerable extra time to 
perform the task and there is no time pressure or need to 
speed up to do the task in time. 
1  Not applicable.  This PSF is not relevant for this task or scenario.  
 
2.5.4 Quantification Process 
The process of quantifying the HEP for each human failure event is nearly identical to that of 
SPAR-H, and therefore a detailed explanation will not be repeated. An important distinction 
between SPAR-H and Petro-HRA is that Petro-HRA only features a single nominal HEP set at 1E-
2 (0.01). This nominal HEP is equivalent to the higher nominal HEP associated with cognitive or 
diagnosis tasks in SPAR-H. Essentially, Petro-HRA does away with the separation of Diagnosis 
and Action in SPAR-H and assumes all HFEs contain elements of both. In some analyses, this may 
result in possible conservatism in Petro-HRA compared to SPAR-H. 
The completed table for each of the three previously identified HFEs including detect well 
kick, respond to well kick, and disconnect well is shown in Table 7. The HFE evidence used to 
assign PSF levels for SPAR-H was also used to populate the PSF multipliers in this table. The 
assigned values are similar to SPAR-H and follow the same general pattern in which stress was 
elevated in both HFE2, recovery from blowout event, and even more so during HFE3, well 
disconnect. Complexity was higher in HFE2 than either of the other HFEs. Unlike SPAR-H, which 
doesn’t have a designated physical working environment PSF, here the physical working 
environment was significantly deteriorated during HFE3, in which the fire from the blowout event 
made it difficult for the crew to reach the control room and activate the emergency disconnect 
function.   
The basic HEPs for the three HFEs are calculated as the product of the nominal HEP and the 
PSF multipliers: 
Detect well kick: HEPHFE1 = 0.01 × 100 = 1.0 (Eq. 19) 
Respond to well kick: HEPHFE2 = 0.01 × 400 = 4.0 ≈ 1.0 (Eq. 20) 
Table 7 – Petro-HRA Assignments for Well Kick Detection, Response, and Disconnect 
PSFs PSF Levels 
HFE1: Well Kick 
Detection 




Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier 
Time 
Extremely high negative HEP=1 HEP=1 HEP=1 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Moderate positive 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Threat Stress 
High negative 25 25 25 
Low negative 5 5 5 
Very low negative 2 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Task Complexity 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Very low negative 2 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Moderate positive 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Experience/Training 
Extremely high negative HEP=1 HEP=1 HEP=1 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 15 15 15 
Low negative 5 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Moderate positive 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Procedures 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
High negative 25 25 25 
Low negative 5 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Low positive 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Human-Machine 
Interface 
Extremely high negative HEP=1 HEP=1 HEP=1 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Low positive 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Attitudes to Safety, 
Work and Management 
Support 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Low positive 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Teamwork 
Very high negative 50 50 50 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Very low negative 2 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Low positive 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
Physical working 
environment 
Extremely high negative HEP=1 HEP=1 HEP=1 
Moderate negative 10 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 1 
Not applicable 1 1 1 
 
Well Disconnect: HEPHFE3 = 0.01 × 25000 = 250.0 ≈ 1.0 (Eq. 21) 
Note that the Petro-HRA guidance specifies that an HEP greater than 1.0 should be set as 1.0. 
This correction has been applied for HFE2 and HFE3. 
2.5.5 Apply Correction Factor for Dependence 
The same calculations and adjustments for dependence performed for the SPAR-H analysis 
are also performed here for the Petro-HRA method. The reader can refer back to the Section 2.4.6 
on SPAR-H dependence for the equations. Note that where the basic HEP is 1.0, there is no change 
to the overall conditional HEP considering dependence. The results of the calculations are shown 
below for each HFE: 
Detect well kick: Final (Conditional) HEPHFE1 = 1.0 (Eq. 22) 
Respond to well kick: Final (Conditional) HEPHFE2 = 1.0 (Eq. 23) 
Well Disconnect: Final (Conditional) HEPHFE3 = 1.0 (Eq. 24) 
These HEPs are considerably more conservative than the HEPs produced for SPAR-H. As 
noted in a paper on a similar event analysis [17], whereas SPAR-H was developed for retrospective 
analyses, Petro-HRA was developed for prospective analyses. This difference may contribute to 
the conservatism of Petro-HRA. 
2.6 Example Analysis Using CREAM 
2.6.1 Overview 
The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) method [10] provides a 
different approach from SPAR-H to quantify the HEP for each HFE. CREAM contains a basic and 
extended method. The basic method corresponds to an initial screening of the human interactions. 
The screening or basic method addresses either the task as a whole or major segments of the task. 
The extended method uses the outcome of the basic method to look at actions or parts of the task 
where there is a need for further precision and detail. The following sections describe how to use 
the basic and extended method using the same HFEs examined with the SPAR-H and Petro-HRA 
methods in the prior sections. 
2.6.2 CREAM Basic Method 
There are three steps to the CREAM Basic Method: 
1. Describe the task or task segments to be analyzed. This task is analogous to defining the 
HFE and any subtasks associated with the HFE. 
2. Assess the Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). The CPCs are essentially PSFs. 
3. Determine the probable control mode. The CPCs are used to classify the control mode as 
either strategic, tactical, opportunistic, or scrambled. 








HFE1: Well Kick Detection HFE2: Well Kick Response HFE3: Well Disconnect 
Adequacy of organization 
Very efficient Very efficient Very efficient 
Efficient Efficient Efficient 
Inefficient Inefficient Inefficient 
Deficient Deficient Deficient 
Working condition 
Advantageous Advantageous Advantageous 
Compatible Compatible Compatible 
Incompatible Incompatible Incompatible 
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
Supportive Supportive Supportive 
Adequate Adequate Adequate 
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 
Availability of procedures / 
plans 
Appropriate Appropriate Appropriate 
Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable 
Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 
Number of simultaneous goals 
Fewer than capacity Fewer than capacity Fewer than capacity 
Matching current capacity Matching current capacity Matching current capacity 
More than capacity More than capacity More than capacity 
Available time 
Adequate Adequate Adequate 
Temporarily inadequate Temporarily inadequate Temporarily inadequate 
Continuously inadequate Continuously inadequate Continuously inadequate 
Time of day 
Day-time (adjusted) Day-time (adjusted) Day-time (adjusted) 
Night-time (unadjusted) Night-time (unadjusted) Night-time (unadjusted) 
Adequacy of training and 
experience 







Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate 
Crew collaboration quality 
Very efficient Very efficient Very efficient 
Efficient Efficient Efficient 
Inefficient Inefficient Inefficient 
Deficient Deficient Deficient 
 
For Step 2, Table 8 represents a summary of the level/descriptors on each CPC for the three 
HFEs. CREAM maps well to the earlier SPAR-H and Petro-HRA examples, but differs on a few 
items. For example, the working conditions CPC is a factor uniquely considered in CREAM and 
is not covered as a standalone PSF in other HRA methods like SPAR-H or Petro-HRA. Table 9 
shows the selected effects of each CPC for the three HFEs in this analysis. These effects are 
important for calculation of the HEP. 
 
 
Table 7 - Summary of the CPC Level Assignments and Their Performance Effects in CREAM 
 
CPC name 





















Inefficient Reduced Inefficient Reduced Inefficient Reduced 
Working 
condition 























Available time Adequate Improved Adequate Improved Adequate Improved 






























As the last step, the combined CPC score expressed as the triplet [∑Reduced, ∑Not significant, 
∑Improved] is calculated, whereby the total number of instances is summed for the negative, nominal, 
and positive effects, respectively. For example, in case of HFE1, the triplet is estimated as [4, 3, 
2], meaning four negative, three nominal, and two positive effects. The negative and positive 
effects are used to determine the control mode in Figure 2, whereby the negative (i.e., reduced 
reliability) number of CPCs is treated as the horizontal axis and the positive (i.e., improved 
reliability) number of CPCs is treated as the vertical axis. This process classifies the HFE into one 
of four control modes—scrambled, opportunistic, tactical, or strategic. Table 10 provides the 
reliability interval for the HEP for each control mode.  
The reliability interval for the three HFEs is summarized in Table 11. In all cases, the Basic 
CREAM analysis produced an opportunistic control mode with in HEP reliability interval of 1.0E-
2 < p < 0.5E-0.  
  
Figure 2 – Relationship Between Improved and Reduced Performance and Control Modes in 
CREAM (adapted from [10]) 
 
Improve 
7 Strategic Strategic Strategic        
6 Strategic Strategic Strategic Tactical       
5 Strategic Strategic Tactical Tactical Tactical      
4 Strategic Tactical Tactical Tactical Tactical Tactical     
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 Reduce  
 
Table 8 - Control Modes and Probability Intervals (adapted from [10]) 
 
Control mode Reliability Interval 
Strategic 0.5e-5 < p < 1.0e-2 
Tactical 1.0e-3 < p < 1.0e-1 
Opportunistic 1.0e-2 < p < 0.5e-0 
Scrambled 1.0e-1 < p < 1.0e-0 
 
 




[∑Reduced, ∑Not significant, ∑Improved] 
Control mode Reliability Interval 
HFE1 [4, 3, 2] Opportunistic 1.0e-2 < p < 0.5e-0 
HFE2 [4, 3, 2] Opportunistic 1.0e-2 < p < 0.5e-0 
HFE3 [6, 1, 2] Opportunistic 1.0e-2 < p < 0.5e-0 
 
2.6.3 CREAM Extended Method 
The Basic CREAM method produces a range of HEPs suitable for screening. In contrast, the 
Extended CREAM method produces a more specific HEP akin to other HRA methods. There are 
three steps of the Extended CREAM method: 
1. Build or develop a profile of the cognitive demands of the task. This step entails classifying 
each step in the HFE according to its cognitive demands. Cognitive demands encompass 
observation, interpretation, planning, and execution. These are similar to the Diagnosis vs. 
Action distinction in SPAR-H, but at a finer level of granularity. 
2. Identify the likely cognitive function failures. Cognitive demands lead to failures, and CREAM 
provides a table of possible failure types for each demand.  
3. Determine the specific action failure probability. In this step, CREAM’s equivalent of an HEP 
is calculated.  
For Step 1, Table 12 indicates task steps or activities on each HFE, their basic cognitive 
activities, and cognitive demands. The cognitive activity consists of fifteen cognitive activity 
types—coordinate, communicate, compare, diagnose, evaluate, execute, identify, maintain, 
monitor, observe, plan, record, regulate, scan, and verify. These cognitive activities are matched 
to each of the four cognitive demands. Multiple demands may be present.  
 
Table 10 - Task Steps or Activities of each HFE and Corresponding Cognitive Demands 
 
HFE 









Ensure return mud 
flow is rising 
Monitor     
Ensure BSR does not 
need be closed and 
sealed 
Observe     
Ensure annulus are 
not sealed 
Observe     
Ensure formation 
fluid does not rise 







Execute     
Lower marine riser 
package disconnect 




Ensure BOP is 
unavailable 
Observe     
Decision making for 
well disconnect 
Diagnose     
Push two buttons for 
well disconnect 
Execute     
 
In Step 2, the analyst identifies the most likely cognitive function failures. The generic 
CREAM failure types are found in Table 13, while the specific ones identified for the HFEs are 
found in Table 14.  
  
Table 11 - Generic Cognitive Function Failures (adapted from [10]) 
 
Cognitive Function Potential Cognitive Function Failure 
Observation 
O1 Observation of wrong object. A response is given to the wrong stimulus or event. 
O2 Wrong identification made, due to e.g. a mistaken cue or partial identification. 
O3 Observation not made (i.e., omission), overlooking a signal or a measurement. 
Interpretation 
I1 Faulty diagnosis, either a wrong diagnosis or an incomplete diagnosis. 
I2 
Decision error, either not making a decision or making a wrong or incomplete 
decision. 
I3 Delayed interpretation, i.e., not made in time. 
Planning 
P1 Priority error, as in selecting the wrong goal (intention) 
P2 Inadequate plan formulated, when the plan is either incomplete or directly wrong. 
Execution 
E1 
Execution of wrong type performed, with regard to force, distance, speed or 
direction. 
E2 Action performed at wrong time, either too early or too late 
E3 Action on wrong object 
E4 Action performed out of sequence, such as repetitions, jumps, and reversals 
E5 
Action missed, not performed (i.e., omission), including the omission of the last 
actions in a series (“undershoot”) 
 
Table 12 - Potential Cognitive Function Failure Modes for the Task Steps for Each HFE 
 




Ensure return mud flow is rising O2 Wrong identification made 
Ensure BSR does not need be closed and 
sealed 
O2 Wrong identification made 
Ensure annulus are not sealed O2 Wrong identification made 
Ensure formation fluid does not rise O2 Wrong identification made 
HFE2: 
Respond to Well 
Kick 
ROV intervention E3 Action on wrong object 
Lower marine riser package disconnect E3 Action on wrong object 
HFE3: 
Well Disconnect 
Ensure BOP is unavailable O2 Wrong identification made 
Decision making for well disconnect I3 Delayed interpretation 
Push two buttons for well disconnect E3 Action on wrong object 
 
In Step 3, the HEP is calculated. In CREAM terminology, this is called the cognitive failure 
probability (CFP). A nominal HEP lookup table is provided by CREAM for each function failure 
mode, as depicted in Table 15. Table 16 provides the nominal HEPs specific to the three HFEs. 
Table 17 provides the weighting factors for the CPCs. Each task’s nominal HEP (i.e., CFP in 
CREAM terminology) is multiplied by the sum of the CPC weighting factors, and the largest 
overall task HEP is retained as the HEP for that HFE. Table 18 shows the CPC weightings for each 
HFE, and Table 19 summarizes the final result. 
 
Table 15 - Nominal CFP Values and Uncertainty Bounds for Cognitive Function Failures 




Generic failure type 
Lower bound 
(.05) 




O1 3.0E-4 1.0E-3 3.0E-3 
O2 1.0E-3* 3.0E-3* 9.0E-3* 
O3 1.0E-3* 3.0E-3* 9.0E-3* 
Interpretation 
I1 9.0E-2 2.0E-1 6.0E-1 
I2 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-1 
I3 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-1 
Planning 
P1 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-1 
P2 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-1 
Execution 
E1 1.0E-3 3.0E-3 9.0E-3 
E2 1.0E-3 3.0E-3 9.0E-3 
E3 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-3 
E4 1.0E-3 3.0E-3 9.0E-3 
E5 2.5E-2 3.0E-2 4.0E-2 
*Corrected from erroneous values in the original CREAM documentation [10] 
 
Table 16 - Summary of Basic CFP Value of Each Potential Cognitive Function Failure 
 
 








Ensure return mud flow is rising O2 3.0E-3 
Ensure BSR does not need be closed and 
sealed 
O2 3.0E-3 
Ensure annulus are not sealed O2 3.0E-3 





ROV intervention E3 5.0E-4 




Ensure BOP is unavailable O2 3.0E-3 
Decision making for well disconnect I3 1.0E-2 
Push two buttons for well disconnect E3 5.0E-4 






Observation Interpretation Planning Execution 
Adequacy of organization 
Very efficient 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 
Efficient 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Inefficient 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 
Deficient 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 
Working condition 
Advantageous 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Compatible 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Incompatible 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
Supportive 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 
Adequate 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Tolerable 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Inappropriate 5.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 
Availability of procedures / 
plans 
Appropriate 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.8 
Acceptable 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Inappropriate 2.0 1.0 5.0 2.0 
Number of simultaneous 
goals 
Fewer than capacity 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Matching current 
capacity 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
More than capacity 2.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 
Available time 
Adequate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Temporarily inadequate 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Continuously 
inadequate 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Time of day 
Day-time (adjusted) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Night-time (unadjusted) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 




0.8 0.5 0.5 0.8 
Adequate, limited 
experience 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Inadequate 2.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 
Crew collaboration quality 
Very efficient 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Efficient 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Inefficient 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Deficient 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 
 
  
Table 18 - Summary of the CPC Weightings for Task Steps Included in Each HFE 
 




Step # 1 
Task  
Step # 2 
Task  
Step # 3 
Task  
Step # 4 
HFE1 
Adequacy of organization Inefficient 1 1 1 1 
Working condition Compatible 1 1 1 1 
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
Supportive 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Availability of procedures / 
plans 
Inappropriate 2 2 2 2 
Number of simultaneous goals Fewer than capacity 1 1 1 1 
Available time Adequate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Time of day Night time 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 




1 1 1 1 
Crew collaboration quality Inefficient 1 1 1 1 
Total influence of CPCs 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 
HFE2 
Adequacy of organization Inefficient 1.2 1.2   
Working condition Compatible 1 1   
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
Supportive 0.5 0.5   
Availability of procedures / 
plans 
Inappropriate 2 2   
Number of simultaneous goals Fewer than capacity 1 1   
Available time Adequate 0.5 0.5   
Time of day Night time 1.2 1.2   




1 1   
Crew collaboration quality Inefficient 1 1   
Total influence of CPCs 9.4 9.4   
HFE3 
Adequacy of organization Inefficient 1 1 1.2  
Working condition Incompatible 2 2 2  
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
Supportive 0.5 1 0.5  
Availability of procedures / 
plans 
Inappropriate 2 1 2  
Number of simultaneous goals Fewer than capacity 1 1 1  
Available time Adequate 0.5 0.5 0.5  
Time of day Night time 1.2 1.2 1.2  




1 1 1  
Crew collaboration quality Inefficient 1 1 1  
Total influence of CPCs 10.2 9.7 10.4  
 
Table 19 - The Adjusted CFP for Each Task Step and the Final CFPs for HFEs 
 
 
3 Method Comparison and Summary 
Here, we offer brief insights on the methods, based on the example analysis for the three HFEs. 
The final HEPs for the three HFEs across the three HRA methods are found in Table 20. As can 
be seen, Petro-HRA exhibits an overall very conservative tendency across the HFEs. SPAR-H and 
CREAM exhibit slightly less conservatism but do not offer good inter-method agreement. 
Generally SPAR-H proved more conservative than Extended CREAM, but the SPAR-H HEPs 
were comparable to the screening values produced by Basic CREAM. SPAR-H and Petro-HRA 
proved easier to estimate than CREAM, with fewer steps toward quantification, but CREAM 
provided greater consideration of factors to consider in the analysis, potentially offering a more 
nuanced account of the event. 
 
Table 20 - Final HEPs Produced by the HRA Methods for the Three HFEs 
 
HRA Method HFE1: Detect HFE2: Recovery HFE3: Disconnect 
SPAR-H 1.10E-1 4.22E-1 6.14E-1 
Petro-HRA 1.0 1.0 1.0 
CREAM 2.76E-2 4.70E-3 9.70E-2 
 
This article stops short of providing recommendations to use specific HRA methods. The 
example retrospective analysis is a single snapshot of the methods, and a large-scale benchmark 
of HRA methods for oil and gas applications has not yet been performed. As part of a benchmark, 












Ensure return mud flow is getting 
high. 
3.0E-3 9.2 2.76E-2 
2.76E-2 
Ensure BSR does not be closed and 
sealed. 
3.0E-3 9.2 2.76E-2 
Ensure annulus does not sealed. 3.0E-3 9.2 2.76E-2 
Ensure formation fluid does not rise. 3.0E-3 9.2 2.76E-2 
HFE2 
 
Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) 
intervention 
5.0E-4 9.4 4.70E-3 
4.70E-3 
Lower marine riser package 
disconnect 
5.0E-4 9.4 4.70E-3 
HFE3 
 
Ensure BOP is unavailable. 3.0E-3 10.2 3.06E-2 
9.70E-2 Decision making for well disconnect. 1.0E-2 9.7 9.70E-2 
Push two buttons for well disconnect 5.0E-4 10.4 5.20E-3 
no comparison has been performed to demonstrate consistency of analysts using these methods for 
offshore applications, meaning the inter-analyst variability is not well understood. Moreover, the 
HEPs have not been validated, and it is not possible to say that a particular method has more 
accurately quantified the event. Still, some recommendations can be extracted from the sample 
application of the methods: 
 For quick analysis, SPAR-H and Basic CREAM provide a succinct and seemingly conservative 
approach to quantify the HEP. 
 There is still limited application of Petro-HRA for retrospective analyses of events that have 
occurred, and more experience and guidance are warranted. 
 Petro-HRA provides the most complete guidance on formulating the HFE compared to SPAR-
H and CREAM. If no HFE has been defined in the underlying PRA, the Petro-HRA guidance 
should be consulted. 
 All three HRA methods considered here use some form of PSFs to quantify nominal HEPs. 
While these PSFs may be slightly different in wording, it is easy to crosswalk the PSFs to 
account for the main performance drivers in comparable ways. 
 Petro-HRA has only a single nominal HEP, SPAR-H has two, and CREAM has multiple. 
Where consideration of nominal conditions is important, a more nuanced version of the 
nominal HEPs may be helpful to the analyst such as is found in CREAM. 
 The terminology in SPAR-H is the most nuclear specific of the three methods and may require 
some degree of interpretation and extrapolation to match to petroleum contexts. 
 Petro-HRA is well aligned with petroleum tasks, but it proved very conservative, producing 
HEPs equal to 1.0 for all three HFEs. 
 CREAM proves a flexible method that works well in the oil and gas domain. 
Thus, the use of particular HRA methods represents tradeoffs. Analysts should be aware of these 
tradeoffs and ensure that HRAs performed with these methods are credible in their outputs. Likely, 
no HRA method serves all oil and gas applications equally. Thus, the selection of the particular 
HRA method must be based on analyst insights into the best method for that analysis. Additionally, 
there clearly remains research to be done on the use of HRA methods for retrospective analysis in 
the oil and gas industry. The findings of this comparison point to the need to validate and refine 
HRA methods for petroleum purposes. Still, there is considerable value in the methods, and they 
can be readily used to support retrospective analysis with varying degrees of conservatism. 
4 Disclaimer 
This work was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their 
employees makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility 
for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately-owned rights. Idaho National 
Laboratory is a multi-program laboratory operated by Battelle Energy Alliance LLC, for the 
United States Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517. 
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